To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation + (REDD+) scheme, we oer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically dierent information rent / eciency trade-o due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be oered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain ecient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.
One of the primary sources of carbon emissions is deforestation and forest degradation, which is responsible for total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions of approximately 12% (van der Werf et al. (2009) , IPCC (2014)). These emissions are the second highest human-induced source of climate change (Lederer (2011) ). There is an urgent need to cope with deforestation because induced climate change costs were estimated to increase to US$ 1 trillion by the 2100 time horizon (Eliasch (2008) ). According to Kindermann et al. (2008) , curbing deforestation is not an infeasible task, and Eliasch (2008) rewarding them to implement reductions in carbon emissions from forests, while covering their opportunity costs to do so by potentially altering their development paths or at least by stopping some of the marginally protable forest conversion. This payment occurs either through a direct monetary transfer or through carbon osets or credits saleable on the carbon market. The payment-basis lies in per unit reductions of deforestation in comparison to a baseline that needs to be agreed upon. As a consequence, the additionality issue is crucial because the contract must ensure that "one is only paying for emissions reductions or stock enhancements that come on top of what would have happened without the contract" (Angelsen (2010) ). According to Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) , the originality of REDD+ lies in its incentive properties because it intrinsically rewards states for their achievements in actions against deforestation. However the additionality issue gave rise to an intense debate, that underlined the risk of rewarding tropical hot air, i.e., avoided deforestation that would also have been achieved without the REDD+ contract (Angelsen (2008a) ).
The aim of this paper is to complement the pragmatic approaches adopted until now with a theoretical analysis to propose a cost-ecient alternative REDD+ mechanism, that avoids the ineciencies of the current agreements due to potential information asymmetries. The objectives are then to take explicitly into account the risk of hot air due to ex ante asymmetric information and to theoretically design the ideal cost-ecient REDD+ scheme as a contractual relationship between countries in the light of the theory of incentives. To the best of our knowledge, there is no analytical paper of the REDD+ scheme in terms of the theory of incentives with a Principal-Agent relationship under this kind of asymmetric information 2 and exogenous implementation and transaction costs.
In the literature however, several studies have been interested in climate change mitigation and low cost policies compared to costly abatement of fossil fuel emissions, particularly regarding avoided deforestation (Heal and Conrad (2006) , Murray long-run forest conservation. In a dynamic setting, they propose a transfer function that rewards developing countries both positively with the forest stock and negatively with the deforestation rate. Further to this approach, Ollivier (2012) studies the REDD+ mechanism as an international transfer and its impacts in the long-run on developing countries' growth. She analyzes the impacts of low and high transfer schemes to prevent agricultural land expansion and the interplay with the manufacturing sector.
In a contractual perspective, Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) describe literally how the theory of incentives is at the core of the REDD+ scheme, whereas Kerr (2013) and Angelsen (2017) propose to design results-based agreements and result-based aid (RBA), respectively, for REDD+ through a Principal-Agent framework. However, they do not consider formally incomplete information issues in using this framework. From our side, we distinguish our approach while using the theory of incentives with a Principal-Agent relationship in designing contracts with informational issues (Laont and Martimort (2002) ). This approach has been used by Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2016) in the context of multinational environmental agreements, by Mason and Plantinga (2013) to address the additionality issue raised by carbon osets in the contracts oered by a government to landowners to induce carbon sequestration in forests, and by Horowitz and Just (2013) in the case of payments for environmental services to agricultural rms.
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(2010) acknowledge the additionality issue implied by the REDD+ contracts and propose to replace the historical deforestation baselines with negotiated baselines to induce participation and to mitigate the adverse selection issue.
Building on a thorough analysis of the REDD+ scheme, we show how the confusion between the concepts of business-as-usual deforestation path and of reference levels can lead to reward hot air for some countries, and we propose on the contrary to base the contract only on observable variables. Even though we acknowledge that some moral hazard may also plague the relationship between a recipient country and landowners, mainly at the implementation stage, we concentrate on the adverse selection issue essentially because the latter has not been studied yet in this context whereas the former has already been broadly analyzed in the literature. 5 As a consequence, we analyze the REDD+ mechanism in a reduced form way, considering that, within the recipient country, the subnational hierarchical relationships are conducted in an ecient way. We consider thus two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract (DC ) dierent from the current REDD+ contract, and a policy-based contract (PC ) corresponding to proposals arising in the literature and policy papers through the adoption of policy reforms to avoid deforestation. We discuss further the menus of contracts a developed country should oer in terms of environmental eciency regarding a developing country's hidden information and expected welfare.
From our analytical framework, we obtain several important results. First, we can state that the type of REDD+ contract proposed creates a dierent information rent / eciency trade-o, the dierence being amplied because we take account of implementation, governance and transaction costs of domestic policies (their crucial role has been underlined by Alston and Andersson (2011) or Laing and Palmer (2015) ). If the contract is deforestation-based, information 3 Sheri (2009) proposes an empirical methodology to calibrate such a second-best land conservation mechanism. 4 Note that there is an extensive literature dedicated to the optimal conservation programs in analyzing optimal compensation schemes at the farm level to overcome information asymmetry between farmers and governments, see Wu and Babcock (1996) and Arguedas and van Soest (2011) among others. 5 For example, MacKenzie et al. (2012) analyze international carbon sequestration contracts as enforcementproof incentive schemes in which a buyer provides an investment for aorestation or reforestation projects to a seller in a developing country. In their framework, the buyer demands a guaranteed delivery of productive level, using a two-tiered payment scheme while facing moral hazard in precaution, limited liability of parties and the potential for opportunistic contract breach. They show that attributing liability to the buyer yields ineciently low levels of investment in carbon sequestration. Cordero-Salas and Roe (2012) and Cordero-Salas et al. (2016) study how REDD+ contracts should induce carbon osets storage over time with self-enforcing contracts, under ex post asymmetric information. They consider additionality and permanence issues in a contractual dynamic setting, especially regarding institutional dierences among the countries in which the contracts will be implemented. They show that ecient levels of additionality can be achieved even when the buyer is uncertain about the landholder's opportunity cost of conservation whereas the value of conservation is suciently high relative to the opportunity cost. rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest projected deforestation to encourage them to induce the highest eciency while coping with deforestation. If the contract is policy-based, then the rent-eciency trade-o occurs in the opposite way and the optimal scheme implies tackling forested countries with the ex ante highest projected deforestation. This result is in line with general ndings in agency theory dealing with hidden information regarding the eciency of input versus output incentive schemes with countervailing incentives created by the choice of the instrument (Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) ), despite the distinctive features of our setting (typedependent reservation utility of the Agent and sensitivity of the Agent's utility to the output), but it had never been stated before in the debate about the appropriate design of REDD+ contracts.
Second, upon comparing these contracts, there is a business-as-usual baseline threshold in terms of environmental eectiveness concerning less deforestation. We show that a general contract can be oered to developing countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous.
Dividing countries into two groups, that choose either the deforestation-based instrument or the policy-based instrument, helps the developed country to obtain ecient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels. As a consequence, our paper strengthens the case of conditionalitybased contracts, as advocated by Combes-Motel et al. (2009) or Karsenty and Ongolo (2012), but only for the developing countries with high projected deforestation baselines, which may not be strictly correlated to their historical trend. It does not encroach on the country's sovereignty because the contract is freely chosen and incentive-compatible.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide key elements of understanding regarding additionality and conditionality to motivate our approach. In Section 3, we present our alternative mechanism progressively: we rst show the equivalence between the deforestation-based contract and the policy-based contract under perfect information and how the current REDD+ contract entails incentives for some countries to inate their deforestation baseline; we analyze then the general contract that can be oered by the donor and we provide a numerical example to emphasize the eciency gains provided. Section 4 concludes.
Analysis of the current REDD+ contract
Being grounded as a performance-based scheme, the REDD+ scheme employs a phased approach (Zarin et al. (2009) , Ollivier (2012), Angelsen (2017)). Phase 1 establishes readiness and capacity building to dene a state-of-the-art of carbon stocks and deforestation levels against which performance should be assessed. Phase 2 denes strategies and policies to address the deforestation drivers focused to implement of a REDD+ strategy, to support national policies.
Phase 3 corresponds to a compensation phase for the developing countries based on performance achieved in reducing deforestation (results-based payments). Funding sources from developed countries currently envisage nancing mainly the compensation phase apart from the readiness phase. 6 In this paper, we focus on national or jurisdictional initiatives between countries towards REDD+, 7 since at the project and local level additionality issues may be addressed more specically through existing certication schemes 8 (Chagas et al., 2013 ).
Additionality and baseline setting
The additionality issue depends critically on the level of the baseline used for rewarding the eorts of the deforesting countries. The baseline's practical determination gave rise to a great debate among academics and practitioners (Angelsen and asymmetric information about the potential conservation projects, but even more about the development objectives of the deforesting country and the policies that it would like to implement.
Facing the diculty of establishing such a BAU baseline taking account of all of the current 6 At COP19, the adopted Framework by the Parties states the following: funding may come from multiple sources, i.e., public and private, countries or international funds and companies, in a bilateral or a multilateral manner; however, developing countries should provide information on how they have respected their commitment before receiving their compensation payments. 7 For example, the international law-based initiatives such as the Green Climate Fund within the UNFCCC to contribute to global climate change mitigation; the multilateral initiatives such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Carbon Fund; or, the bilateral initiatives such as the Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative through the Norway Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund and the Indonesia Norway REDD+ partnership). 8 However we may note that this remains rather imperfect (Seyller et al., 2016). 9 A similar issue occurs with other mechanisms intended to help in climate change mitigation that rely on the determination of a counterfactual scenario, such as Joint Implementation (Wirl et al. (1998) ) or Clean Development Mechanism (Lederer (2011) ). and future national drivers of deforestation, an agreement was reached at COP17 in Durban in 2011 about a pragmatic determination of a reference level (RL) relying on the extrapolation of historical deforestation trends. 10 Such an approach is usually viewed as a conservative one that ensures that additionality is considered (Chagas et al. (2013) ). To cope with the criticism that extrapolating the historical deforestation trends is likely to underestimate the future BAU deforestation for countries at the early stages in the forest transition 11 but overestimate BAU deforestation for countries at the later stages, proposals were made either to include a development adjustment factor (DAF) (Coalition for Rainforest Nations) or to take into account the "common but dierentiated responsibilities" of countries in the collective ght against climate change (Zarin et al. (2009) ). As a result, following the guidance of the COPs, all RLs are expected to rely on historical data, with potential adjustments due to national circumstances that require a detailed justication. Among the diverse nancing institutions for results-based REDD+ actions, only the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Carbon Fund has provided guidance, the Carbon Fund Methodological Framework, that strictly limits the adjustments: for a high deforestation country, the RL cannot exceed the average annual historical emissions over a reference period; for a low deforestation country, the RL may be adjusted upward by at most We can oer two explanations for this evidence. Either all considered countries really projected, in case of no REDD+ agreement, to maintain future deforestation paths higher or at least equal to their historical trend but they nd nevertheless protable to participate because they can envisage to do better enough than this trend with REDD+ funds. Or, some of these 10 Busch et al. (2012) acknowledge the impossibility of establishing whether econometric modelling outperforms extrapolation of historical trends in predicting future emissions. They advocate for future research that should investigate what combination of historical trends, observable geographic characteristics, planned policies and local insights would provide the most accurate prediction of future emissions. 11 According to the forest transition hypothesis, due to Mather (1992) , the rate of deforestation decreases over time because the opportunity costs of deforestation rise with increased forest scarcity, inducing in all countries a change from deforestation to a stable or increasing forest cover. 12 The bilateral negotiation between Norway and Guyana has often been provided as an example of inated RL: the actual annual average deforestation rate over the 2000-2009 period was bound to 0.03% per year whereas Guyana has obtained a contractual commitment with Norway on a 0.275% per year basis worth US$ 250 million in compensation transfers. One can presume that Guyana's real RL has been inated and that Guyana will probably earn some rents from its private information, even if this bargaining outcome was allowed by the urgent need for Norway to start their REDD+ activities. countries had by themselves, being in a later stage of the forest transition (Angelsen (2008b)) or for other domestic reasons, projected a lower deforestation path but they take the opportunity to get the highest possible reward in the REDD+ agreement. Without any intangible proof, there is at least a strong suspicion that some countries may earn some information rents caused by private information about their BAU baselines. This is also highlighted by Kerr (2013) provides an extensive analysis of that case, where the information rents are not eliminated but only bounded by the currently proposed guidance for the determination of the RLs. The current REDD+ contracts appear therefore to be designed in order to mitigate this asymmetric information problem, but we will show in Section 3 that they remain sub-optimal. This feeds into the debate about the appropriate way to design REDD+ as incentive contracts inducing the recipient countries to reveal their private information, and rewarding them according to their actual eorts.
2.2
For a results-based contract relying on observed deforestation rather than on estimated avoided deforestation
The main drawback of the REDD+ contracts is that, despite they intend to be results-based, they actually reward uncertain results, namely an avoided deforestation estimated as the dierence between the observed deforestation and a negotiated or at least projected crediting baseline. Insert Figure 1 At time T of the contract implementation, provisionally to the capacity building developed in the readiness phase (as the rst phase of the REDD+ phased approach), the forest cover φ is the only observable information for the recipient country or equivalently, the historical deforestation trend until this date. At the end of the contract, the realized path can also be observed. The current mechanism recommends the use of the projection of the historical trend as a RL for rewarding avoided deforestation. If, instead of projecting the same deforesting pace for the future without any REDD+ contract, and thus a perfect status quo, the recipient country projects another developing path implying less deforestation than before T , the slope of her BAU baseline is lower, and the path is closer to a constant forest cover φ, as represented in Figure 1 . This BAU baseline is characterized by the amount of deforestation θ that would thus be privately achieved after the contract duration by the eligible country, depending on her economic growth and development, her demographic growth, regulation enforcement, timber export prices, climatic events, etc., as explained in Combes-Motel et al. (2009) . Realizing this BAU baseline may also result from political willingness to enforce or implement regulations, and impose opportunity costs to the deforesting country. These costs are imperfectly known by the donor, or at least better known by the recipient, which is the source of incomplete information between parties. Let us now assume that the REDD+ agreement enables the recipient country to achieve an even lower realized deforestation path. If we denote d the deforestation realized at the end of the contract, the realized avoided deforestation a is equal to θ − d. This avoided deforestation is the true measure of the eort done by the recipient, who should be rewarded for it. However, as soon as the historical trend (adjusted for the previously low deforesting countries) has been chosen as a "conservative" RL against which the performance is to be measured, it is clear from the gure that some hot air will also be rewarded: in this case, considering the RL to be identical to the deforestation BAU baseline allows remaining informational rent to countries with lower BAU baselines than their historical trends. They have incentives not to disclose their true BAU baseline and to accept the reward against RL. On the contrary, for countries with higher BAU baselines θ (with a path lower than RL, not represented in Figure 1 to keep it clear), there is no opportunity left to be rewarded for any hot air nor for their whole eort. In this case the RL can be interpreted as the upper bound set by the international community to the accepted ex post deforestation under the REDD+ contract. From these observations, we argue that a performance-based contract should rather be based on observable variables, such as the realized deforestation d, instead of on estimated variables measured against an ad hoc RL.
2.3
Alternative proposal: conditionality to domestic policies REDD+ payments leave the choice of policy instruments to the recipient countries. Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) call REDD+ payments as non conditional, since they are not related to the adoption of policy measures or changes in the legal or institutional framework. REDD+ is then "not encroaching on the sovereign discretion of nations to design acceptable and adequate policies and measures nationally" (Streck (2010) ). These payments are actually conditional to results instead of policies. Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) advocate for an alternative architecture for REDD+ relying on conditionality for carbon payments, i.e., payments based on the implementation of policies and measures targeting the drivers of deforestation. By addressing the structural causes of deforestation and degradation, they state that REDD+ payments could "be used as an investment instrument for funding policies on specic and ambitious programs able to tackle the major structural problems that underlie much of deforestation in such countries:
agriculture, land, the means and the functioning of justice and of the administration of control ".
They argue that conditionality would help to address the additionality issue. One of our aims is to theoretically assess the eectiveness and eciency of a REDD+ scheme incorporating this proposal. In the widest sense of the word, conditionality generally refers to the use of conditions imposed by the donors on the recipients for the allocation of funds. 13 These conditions are built on agreed terms and commitments to obtain a desired outcome. In this sense, conditionality has been emphasized by Drazen (2002) as really helpful for reform-minded governments who need to overcome internal opposition, as it can be the case for countries projecting a high deforestation BAU baseline.
As underlined by Angelsen (2017), result-based aid (RBA) includes in its broad sense the various forms of conditional payments and not solely those based upon results. From our side, we separate the results-based aid (through a deforestation-based contract) from the domestic policy-based aid (through a policy-based contract) that is built on policy reforms incentives.
More precisely, policy-based aid is to be conditioned to the adoption of policy reforms that can be divided into direct and enabling activities, both needed and essential, as underlined by Salvini Kerr (2013) , underline that 13 In this paper, we do not use the term of conditionality in the broad sense of "conditioned to something" and opposite to "unconditional" (as Azam and Laont (2003) ) but in the same narrow sense as Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) and the REDD+ community, meaning that the payments are conditional to domestic policies (and not to results of these policies).
implementing this kind of domestic policies generate "incremental costs" for forested countries that could be covered by REDD+ funds.
Lessons from previous and current experiences in the broader eld of development aid can help design the domestic policy-based contracts for REDD+. Debt-for-nature swap, initiated in the 1980s aims to allow a developing country to use an environmental trust fund through the renegotiation of her external debt by the creditor (van Soest and Lensink (2000), Kerr (2013) ).
This provides capital used to complete policy reforms. However, this is a once-and-for-all funding in which sanctions are limited and sound governance principles are needed in recipient countries to obtain success, which can hamper its applicability to REDD+ mechanisms. The It is worth noting that some recent initiatives within the REDD+ mechanism are currently already conditioned to policy changes. Angelsen (2017) shows that the bilateral experiences of Norway with respectively Guyana and Indonesia lead to a RBA designed on conditional aids in addition to payments for emission reductions (with respect to Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the REDD+ phased approach). In Brazil, the climate mitigation eorts will be strengthened by Norway with an oer worth US$1 billion in funding through the Amazon Fund managed by the Brazilian Development Bank, with most conditional on continued success. More generally, conditional fundings could be attached to given policy reforms, which are decided jointly by the donor and the recipient, that would target the potential drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.
Whereas the SAP has been contested for encroaching of the sovereignty of the recipients, it would be less the case for REDD+ fundings based on negotiated specic interventions. Their eciency could be strengthened through a phasing of nancial support in successive tranches contingent on progress in achieving policy adjustments, as in international aid programs (Collier (1997) ).
A new design proposal for the REDD+ contract
The measure of actual results of policies aiming at reducing deforestation and forest degradation depends currently both on the possibility to monitor the output and on the RL used to measure the avoided deforestation. We argue that it is much more consistent and cost-ecient to consider only observable variables instead of basing contracts on constructed variables compared to announced RLs. We disentangle these two components by assuming that the BAU deforestation baseline is privately known by the recipient, which can jeopardize additionality, and that per- if deforestation alone can be rather easily monitored (through observation satellite), it is not the case for forest degradation and we consider in this paper that both deforestation and forest degradation or domestic policies to avoid them are similarly, if not equally, costly to monitor.
Facing these monitoring costs, the Principal in a Principal-Agent framework must decide which variable to observe during the contract, and making this instrument contractible depends on the cost (measurement cost and enforcement cost). This leads the Principal to propose either a contract based on realized deforestation or a contract based on policy implementation to avoid deforestation. These two contractual relationships are connected to respectively output and input incentive schemes. 15 The model that we design can be viewed as a joint adaptation of the adverse selection models of Laont and Tirole (1986) and Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) 14 This involves process indicators with completion of national REDD+ plan or Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) consultations through meetings, expertise, etc. (Angelsen (2017)). 15 These contractual relationships were formerly analyzed by Maskin and Riley (1985) and Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) . These papers point out the superiority of output-based schemes over input-based schemes in asymmetric informational contexts, except in case of countervailing incentives.
to the specic setting of REDD+ schemes, that includes distinctive features. Both contracts are incentive feasible and may oer a cost-ecient operational way to implement the REDD+ scheme.
3.1
An agency model and the benchmark case under perfect information
The REDD+ scheme establishes a bilateral relationship between a developed country or a supranational funding institution centralizing contributions by developed countries, which is identied as the donor in the REDD+ terminology, and a developing country identied as the recipient.
Using usual terms of the theory of agency, the donor acts as a Principal and the developing country as an Agent of the agency relationship created by the REDD+ arrangement, respectively.
In this contractual relationship between the donor and the recipient, the objectives can be summed up in the following way: the aim of the donor is to mitigate climate change by indirectly reducing deforestation and forest degradation (mainly tropical forests) while delegating this task to the recipient; the aim of the recipient is in turns to stimulate her economic growth while controlling deforestation according to a set of thresholds regarding her commitment with the donor. The recipient is a priori capable of modifying deforestation levels but incurs opportunity costs due to potential growth loss, imperfectly known by the donor, which is the source of incomplete information between parties. Reducing the deforestation level also gives rise to some implementation and transaction costs in the recipient country. To create incentives to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, the donor oers a contract which if it is signed, covers the recipient's costs, and alters her economic growth.
We use as a key variable, the type θ ∈ [θ,θ] that represents the BAU baseline for deforestation and forest degradation projected by the recipient (see Figure 1) , with θ > 0 andθ < φ, where the parameter φ > 0 is assumed to represent the total forest (observable) surface available in the recipient's country at the implementation time T for the contract. Since there is no opportunity of an informational rent for BAU baseline higher than the historical trend (adjusted if the country was previously a low deforesting one),θ is equal to this upper bound RL. Moreover, to keep things simple, we assume that no deforesting country with a BAU baseline higher thanθ could nd protable to participate in the scheme. As usual in contract theory, θ is distributed with respect to the cumulative distribution function F (θ), which is a log-concave common prior, with the associated density function f (θ). 16
The ex post deforestation level is represented by a positive continuous choice variable, d 16 The log-concavity assumption ensures that associated hazard rates are decreasing in θ. Many univariate parametric families of probability distributions are log-concave, including the normal law. which depends on the recipient's actual decisions to avoid deforestation that are set by domestic policies. 17 They are represented by a continuous choice variable a ≥ 0 such that deforestation level is then the dierence:
Within this formulation, the avoided deforestation is merely identied to the decisions a. Hence, except for the recipient, it is not possible (or it is costly) to distinguish between the contribution of the privately known type θ and the actual domestic policies and measures to avoid deforestation a.
These policies and measures refer to public policies such as forest conservation through national parks and the ght against corruption and illegal logging. They also refer to agricultural policies or road infrastructures with potential eects.
The avoided deforestation a is costly for the recipient, which incurs not only the global opportunity cost of the "lost" deforestation but also implementation and domestic transaction costs. 18 These costs are assumed here to be exogenous represented by a monetary disutility ψ(a) (while altering the recipient's development path) such that ψ(0) = 0, ψ (a) > 0 and ψ (a) ≥ 0.
We also assume convexity of the marginal cost of avoided deforestation that is ψ (a) ≥ 0. 19
Hence the recipient's gross surplus is then
where u(d) is the gross utility of deforestation for the recipient assumed to be strictly increasing (u(0) = 0, u (d) > 0) and concave (u (d) ≤ 0) 20 , and t is a continuous choice variable that stands for the monetary transfer paid by the donor to the recipient in the REDD+ scheme. However, outside the REDD+ scheme, eorts are nil, 21 so the recipient's outside option is u (θ − 0) = u (θ), such that S (d, a, t) ≥ u(θ). 17 From now on, in the model, we use mainly the word "deforestation" to refer to both "deforestation and forest degradation". 18 Laing and Palmer (2015) show how these costs basically depend on general equilibrium eects and on lobbying eorts of national interest groups. These implementation and transaction costs could be in turn endogenized through the theory of incentives at a national level between a government and land-users because any actions that the government takes are likely to be exposed to free-riding behavior by parties within the country. 19 This technical assumption means that the marginal cost is increasing, and the assumption avoids nonconvexities in the donor's optimization problem when information is asymmetric. 20 Again, we assume that the technical assumption u (d) ≥ 0 holds, to avoid non-convexities when information is asymmetric. This means that marginal utility must be convex. 21 Indeed, if t = 0, then −u (θ − a) − ψ (a) < 0, and the optimal actual domestic policies to avoid deforestation is clearly a * = 0.
From the total remaining forest cover φ − d, the donor derives a net surplus written as:
where w(·) is his gross utility, assumed to be strictly increasing and concave. 22 These are three ways of considering the gross utility of the donor w(φ − d). First, the gross utility of the donor can be interpreted as the general preference for climate change mitigation because the donor is better o; more carbon can be sequestrated through less deforestation. Second, the gross utility of the donor can also be viewed as a more specic payo derived from less deforestation because it allows carbon credits to be obtained (as with a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)). In the latter case, for example, one could write w (φ − d) = p × g (φ − d), where p would be the carbon price and g (·) an increasing function that allows carbon osets. In that case, careful attention to the additionality issue is clearly required, as emphasized by Mason and Plantinga (2013) . Third, one could also interpret the gross utility as built on an emission-based approach rather than a stock-based approach. Indeed, one could write w
would be the forest amenities, including carbon already stored, and c (e) the damage function increasing with carbon emissions e which would be reduced by less deforestation in turns.
In the following, we do not consider that payments are based on results assessed against the RL but only on observable variables. Three types of mechanisms are considered to analyze our REDD+ schemes: -A deforestation-based contract (DC ) C d ≡ t, d : monitoring eorts focus on actual deforestation and forest degradation (and not on actual domestic policies to reduce deforestation), which are therefore observable and contractible.
-A policy-based contract (PC ) C a ≡ t, a : monitoring eorts focus on observing actual domestic policies to avoid deforestation (and not on actual deforestation and forest degradation), which permits inclusion of them in the mechanism through conditionality.
-A general contract (GC ) which determines whether C d or C a must be proposed to the recipient.
As a benchmark and to clarify the issues involved, let us consider what would be the rst-best REDD+ mechanism for which information on the BAU baseline θ is common knowledge. This situation is what could happen if the BAU baselines were actually equal to the reference levels 22 Since we do not address the political acceptability or the distributive issues in the North country when it nances such projects, there is no need to consider the marginal cost of public funds regarding the monetary transfer t.
computed on the basis of the historical trend. In that case eorts and deforestation levels are observable and both the DC and PC are equivalent. In such a situation, the Principal the donor looks for a domestic policy to avoid deforestation a that maximizes W (d, t):
The (participation) constraint directly implies a lower bound for the payment that is t ≥ u(θ) − u(θ − a) + ψ(a) which is necessarily attained at the rst-best since the scheme is costly for the donor. As a result, the rst best avoided deforestation maximizes the overall surplus W + U and so a F B (θ) is the value of a that obeys the marginal condition: 23 An important feature of the rst-best outcome is that both a F B (θ) and d F B (θ) are increasing 24 with respect to θ: a higher BAU calls for a higher deforestation level for the recipient and also more stringent conditional policy. Another feature is that the monetary transfer is higher when the deforestation level is lower and when the domestic policy is set at a higher level.
Countervailing incentives of the two possible contracts
As underlined in previous sections, the information on BAU baselines cannot be considered as perfectly symmetric. As a result, with asymmetric information, the rst-best contract is not optimal anymore because it can be manipulated by recipient countries. At their rst-best levels, both possible contracts create opposite incentives for REDD+ recipients. Whereas this kind of result is not new in the economic literature, it has never been emphasized in the context of REDD+ contracts. These countervailing incentives are illustrated in an example in the following subsection; a rigorous proof is available in the Appendix. 23 Moreover letting a = θ − d, optimizing over d yields the same result in this rst-best setting. 24 This is due to increasing dierences in (a, θ) and (d, θ) for W + U . Indeed 
Incentives to mimic in a two-country example
In this example, we provide a discretized version of our general framework where two countries have dierent BAU baselines. Both countries have the same initial forest cover φ = 1000 km 2 .
The low deforesting country is characterized by the intended baseline θ = 150km 2 and the high Table 1 illustrates how both countries will in turns mimic each other depending on the instrument oered (respectively DC and PC ). It shows the levels of deforestation d and of avoided deforestation a requested in the rst-best contracts, as well as the levels of monetary transfer t needed to ensure participation, and the rents that would be given (incentives to mimic). In some ways, this is the "cash" that must be given up to the recipient countries to dampen their rational incentives to distort the RL upward or downward according to the contractual scheme oered.
As depicted in Table 1 , DC create incentives to choose an excessive BAU baseline compared to the privately known BAU baseline because the associated transfer includes reimbursement of the total opportunity cost of the recipient, i.e., both the outside surplus and the cost of avoiding deforestation, which is increasing in the BAU baseline picked. This is exactly the case of the current REDD+ mechanism. On the contrary, P C create incentives to understate the BAU baseline level reported because the transfer includes reimbursement of the total opportunity reward of the recipient, i.e., the dierence of the outside and inside gross surpluses, which is decreasing with the announcement.
Choosing a suitable instrument will induce some diculties in the contract design for the donor and create countervailing incentives for a developing country. Consequently, a second-best REDD+ mechanism has to be carefully designed to counterbalance all of these caveats. For the sake of clarity, the following subsections focus on the intuitions underlining the results; the mathematical proofs of the Propositions are provided in the Appendix.
Second-best contracts under asymmetric information
From now on, we aim to nd how the optimal second-best DC and PC should be structured when the BAU baselines are not perfectly known by the donor. In that case, the DC and PC cannot be considered as equivalent anymore: as we have just seen, each scheme embodies dierent incentives for the developing country. The design of these contracts can be viewed as an application of the agency model under adverse selection analyzed in Laont and Martimort (2002) for instance. Based on observable items only, these contracts make use of the revelation principle (Myerson (1979) ) to lead the recipient country to reveal her private information about her true BAU baseline, or equivalently to pick the contract best suited to her type.
When the REDD+ mechanism is built through a deforestation-based contract (DC ), both participation and incentive compatibility constraints must be veried. In the contract C d (θ) = d(θ), t(θ) , the recipient's participation must be ensured. This participation constraint implies that the recipient will sign the contract if she can obtain a net reward, a rent denoted U (θ), which is at least the one obtains with the rst-best contract, i.e., zero. However, for incentive reasons, this rent shall be higher. Incentive compatibility implies that for all BAU baselines, the menu of contracts would be designed such that the developing country, as a recipient, will be better o selecting the contract corresponding to her true BAU baseline than another one and especially not a greater one. With our notations this implies that for θ,θ :
where U (θ,θ) = S(d(θ), θ − d(θ), t(θ)) − u(θ), is the net surplus of the recipient country with the true BAU baseline θ when choosing the contract C d (θ). Considering dierentiable contracts, this incentive compatibility constraints writes in a rst-order manner:
Eq. (2) shows how the net informational rent must be not increasing with θ, to be incentive compatible. More precisely the way the rent decreases reects the fact that, when a DC is signed, the recipient incurs a marginal loss of an increase in her true BAU baseline. Indeed this marginal loss is composed by both a marginal increase of cost of avoiding deforestation due to the increase of the baseline and a marginal increase of outside surplus, which is an opportunity cost within the contract. Hence to tackle reference agreements regarding overstatement incentives (θ > θ) included in DC, the donor will have to give a higher information rent to low-deforesting countries than to high-deforesting ones. This is exactly what we have seen in the two-country example: as low-deforesting countries can obtain a rent mimicking high ones, the donor has to give up such a rent in order to propose a credible contract, while attempting to minimize it.
The optimality of DC for the donor consists in maximizing his expected surplus taking into account both participation and incentive constraints. We now state a proposition that underlines the previous discussion and compares the DC outcome with the rst best.
Proposition 1 The REDD+ incentive compatible deforestation-based contract (DC) entails:
(i) a decreasing informational rent for the recipient when the BAU baseline θ increases;
(ii) more deforestation i.e., d * (θ) > d F B (θ) and less resulting avoided deforestation, i.e.,ã (θ) = θ − d * (θ) < a F B (θ), than the rst-best except for the lowest BAU baseline;
(iii) d * (θ) the optimal deforestation level increases and t * d (θ) the REDD+ optimal transfer decreases with the BAU baseline θ.
In line with the standard theory of incentives, the REDD+ DC implies a rent/eciency tradeo. Deforestation levels must be distorted upwards for any developing country (except the lowest BAU baseline) in order to minimize costly information rents. If the REDD+ scheme promotes to decrease deforestation levels, the optimal deforestation-based scheme implies tackling forest areas where projected deforestation is per se the lowest. Consequently, information rents must be awarded to countries with lowest true deforestation BAU baselines to push them to the highest eciency while coping with deforestation.
Second-best policy-based contracts When the REDD+ mechanism is built through a policy-based contract (PC ) similar arguments as for the DC hold. To ensure both participation of the recipient and incentive compatibility of the contract C a (θ) = a(θ), t(θ) , an informational rent, now denoted V (θ) must be giving up by the donor. Participation implies again that the rent is non negative, V (θ) ≥ 0, but incentive compatibility diers and writes:
By concavity of u(·), we now see that the information rents must be not decreasing with θ to be incentive compatible. This is due to the fact that signing a PC modies the way the recipient evaluates an increase in her true BAU baseline. Indeed, she now earns a marginal reward composed by both a marginal increase of her gross utility of deforestation due to the increase of the baseline and a (weaker) marginal increase of outside surplus. Hence, to tackle reference agreements regarding understatement incentives included in PC, the donor will give a higher information rent to high-deforesting countries than to low-deforesting ones.
Proposition 2 The REDD+ incentive compatible policy-based scheme (PC) entails:
(i) an increasing informational rent for the recipient when the BAU baseline θ increases;
(ii) less avoided deforestation i.e., a * (θ) < a F B (θ) and more resulting deforestationd (θ) = θ − a * (θ) > d F B (θ), than the rst-best except for the highest BAU baseline;
(iii) a * (θ) the optimal avoided deforestation level and t * a (θ) the REDD+ optimal transfer are strictly increasing at the margin with the BAU baseline θ.
The rent/eciency trade-o in the REDD+ PC acts in the opposite way relative to the DC case. Avoided deforestation levels must be distorted downwards for any developing country to minimize costly information rents, except for the higher deforesting one. If the REDD+ scheme promotes conditional deforestation levels, the optimal scheme implies tackling forest areas where intended deforestation is per se the highest. Consequently, information rents are awarded to forest areas with the highest BAU baseline order to encourage them to make the greatest eort to cope with deforestation.
Deforestation-based vs policy-based: what dierence does it make? As analyzed previously, deforestation-based and policy-based contracts appear to have some opposite features.
First of all, information rents vary in opposite directions with respect to the BAU baselines:
deforestation-based schemes call for increasing the payments above the rst-best level for lowdeforesting countries whereas policy-based schemes call for reducing them.
Second, to have more insights about the dierence between both contracts we can compare both DC and PC outcomes by linking avoided and deforestation levels derived for both types of contracts. To state the comparison result, let us noteθ the BAU baseline level for which the DC optimal deforestation d * (θ) and the PC resulting deforestation levelsd(θ) are equal. 25 Proposition 3 For BAU baselines lower (resp. higher) thanθ, resulting outcomes,d(θ) and a(θ), are greater (resp. smaller) than the optimal ones for both DC and PC. Figure 2 provides an illustration of this result showing all optimal outcomes. The results in Proposition 3 show that REDD+ contractual settings have also opposite eects on deforestation country's decisions depending on the BAU baseline. Indeed, for countries with a low projected deforesting activity, i.e., for weakly forest-dependent countries (θ <θ), as expected, DC is more eective for coping with deforestation than PC. Therefore, the resulting avoided deforestation from DC is greater than the corresponding one that PC would recommend. On the contrary, for highly forest-dependent countries (θ >θ), the DC will not reduce deforestation as much as PC would. This is quite inconvenient because these countries could contribute more to reducing the carbon balance-sheets. As a result, the donor could be interested in mixing the two contractual forms in order to reduce deforestation further. For low BAU baselines, a DC seems to be more eective than a PC. The opposite holds for high BAU baselines.
Insert Figure 2 3.3
General contract: choosing between deforestation-based or policy-based contracts The previous discussion shows that there is a room for studying contractual arrangements that mix both contractual forms considered so far through a general contract GC that will allow for choosing the best instrument between a deforestation-based DC scheme and a policy-based P C scheme. Indeed, the intuition seems to indicate that in order to reduce carbon emissions, a DC contract is more eective than a P C one for low BAU baselines and the opposite stands for high BAU baselines. However, mixing that way both contracts cannot be done without ensuring that the incentives are adequately aligned.
Designing the general contract
This kind of sophisticated contract design can be viewed as an application of Bontems and Bourgeon (2000) that analyze in a general manner the relative eciency of output and input incentive schemes in an agency model under adverse selection. In our context, the output incentive scheme 25 For the same valueθ, a * (θ) =ã(θ).
is the DC (the output being the observed deforestation) and the input one the PC (considering policy as input).
A general contract GC can be written as C d , C a that determines whether respectively a DC or a P C scheme must be proposed to the Agent by the Principal. The diculty in this case is that the Principal has to address countervailing incentives created by the contracting choice:
how to conciliate the incentives to overstate the BAU baselines when a DC is oered and the incentives to understate the BAU baselines for PC ?
The following and last result shows that this is possible by reducing the informational rent for some medium BAU baseline, for which the rst-best is optimal.
Proposition 4 There exists a medium value θ * ∈ [θ,θ] of the BAU baseline such that below this value, the DC is proposed, above this value, it is the PC. Optimal levels of deforestation d * (θ) and avoided deforestation a * (θ) remain dened by DC and PC. Consequently, there are no distortions at the bottom and at the top. Finally for the medium BAU baseline θ * , the recipient's rent is zero.
Proposition 4 indicates that it is optimal for the donor to propose DC to countries with the lowest true deforestation BAU baseline and to propose PC to the countries with the highest deforestation BAU baselines. Oering the choice among dierent REDD+ contracts creates countervailing incentives for the developing country that induce more eciency for REDD+ scheme proposals. Indeed, dividing countries into two groups corresponding to two dierent based instruments helps the developed country to obtain deforestation and avoided deforestation levels closer to the rst-best level. Moreover, this choice does not change the contract outcomes, that is deforestation and policy decisions that would be decided in each separate contracts.
Finally, the donor can reduce all informational rents, which are necessarily given up to the contractors, by giving zero rent to a medium deforesting country.
The analysis of the GC suggests that REDD+ deforestation-based contracts should be preferentially proposed to countries in the early stages of their forest transition, which are known to be characterized by high forest cover and low deforestation rates (Angelsen (2008a) ). When the deforestation rate accelerates in later stages, policy-based contracts may be more adapted as REDD+ mechanisms.
General contract in an example
In order to illustrate the contracting choice involved in the general contract, let us return to our leading example. Assume now that for any country that is involved in the REDD+ scheme, the BAU baselines are known to be equiprobably distributed (i.e., as an uniform law so f (θ) = 1/50) over the range of 150km 2 to 200km 2 . As a result, one can nd that the DC and PC write now d * (θ) = 2 5 θ + 50 and a * (θ) = 6 5 θ − 160 and we represent them for some discretized values of the baselines. In Table 2 we present both contracts as if they were proposed separately where in Table 3 , the general contract is depicted. Here the threshold baseline for which a switch of contractual form has to be done is about 175.5km 2 . As we can see, the GC helps reducing the rents allowed to all types of recipient in a substantial way. 26 Note that if the rst best contract was based on the domestic policy, the expected value of deforestation would be higher and stand to 135km 2 .
Considering the informational rents left by the donor to the recipient, the current REDD+ scheme yields high average rents for the recipient E (U ) = 2416.6 in monetary units. For DC and PC contracts, the expected rents are respectively reduced to E U DC = 2333.3 and E U P C = 2000. The GC yields to E U G = 1480.5.
Compared to the current REDD+ scheme, the combined DC and PC contracts in the GC contract have the properties to reduce the average level of deforestation and to reduce the expected rent left to the recipient. Regarding DC or PC stand-alone incentive contracts, they have good nancial features as rents are reduced, but they fail to succeed in environmental terms, as expected deforestation levels increase.
Conclusion
In this paper, we aimed to oer a theoretical analysis of an extended REDD+ scheme in order to deal with potential information asymmetries that are inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current scheme.
Our contribution can be summarized in three components. First, we show that assessing the performance of the contract against a RL constructed on the basis of the historical deforestation trend necessarily leads to reward some hot air for countries who would have, for dierent reasons, already followed a less-deforesting path than their historical trend. To overcome this shortage and reduce the informational rents, we propose to design incentive contracts exclusively based on observable variables, such as the deforestation level realized at the end of the contract. Second, we advocate that policy-based contracts may constitute a more powerful instrument than ex post result-based payments for fragile countries who can be unable to fulll their deforestation commitments by themselves. In that case, the contract should include an agreement on the denition and monitoring of the policy levers to be implemented by the recipient country to address the deforestation drivers. We have demonstrated that rewarding the recipient country, through non-linear payments either on observed deforestation or on monitored policy, reduces the rent left by the donor but increase the expected deforestation. Third, we propose to oer a general contract that may allow recipient countries to handle the choice of instruments with regard to their particular contexts. Our results strengthen the case of conditionality-based contracts (in the sense of Karsenty and Ongolo (2012)) but only for the developing countries with the highest intended deforestation BAU baseline, which is not strictly equivalent to their historical trend.
For countries still picking deforestation-based contracts, we have proved that instead of using an extrapolation of their historical deforestation trend as a RL, a simple non-linear transfer would permit revelation of the projected BAU baseline of the country and reduce both the excessive deforestation allowed by the current REDD+ contracts and the information rent granted to the deforesting countries.
The emergence of legitimate rents for recipients built on an informational base is a key feature of the Principal-Agent approach we adopt to analyze DC or PC REDD+ schemes. Nevertheless, other issues related to performance-based payments may distort the level and the strength of these rents. For instance in our general contract, high rents may be awarded to countries with low or high BAU baselines at the end of the contract in return for low deforestation rates during the commitment period. This is indeed optimal if the donor's credibility in being tough, mainly with medium BAU baselines recipients, is suciently strong, which is actually the case in our approach since the donor, acting as a Principal, is assumed to hold all bargaining power. However, some doubts about this credibility have been highlighted in the literature, but, as explained in Angelsen (2017) , the authority for disbursement is more and more handed over to third parties as the World Bank for example or through multinational programs which clearly has an increasing eect in the credibility of the donation process.
Another issue that could dampen the eectiveness of the rents distribution is that resultbased schemes put all external risk on the recipient. Indeed, avoided deforestation and forest degradation may cause recipients to bear uncertain costs due to radical changes in the structure of the agricultural income. In some sense, this causes an increase in the outside opportunity expected gains from not participating to REDD+ programs. To take this issue into account, the donor could raise ex ante the payments by incorporating a risk premium.
A last issue is that all parties involved in REDD+ contracts may be capital-constrained.
Low income recipients may have nancial diculties to engage in costly actions during the commitment period, whereas they will be rewarded only at the end of the contract. To circumvent this obstacle, one could imagine that in case of deforestation-based contract, the donor could also act as a lender that would clear the debt at the end of the contract (at the expense of an additional moral hazard issue), whereas in the policy-based contract, the fundings could be paid in successive tranches contingent on progress in achieving policy reforms.
Appendix: proofs
Proof of Countervailing Incentives: We show here that the rst-best contract is not optimal if θ is private information for the recipient. Indeed reporting to the donor a baselineθ instead of θ, leads to a net information rent U (θ,θ) depending on whether the deforestation level d F B (θ) or the domestic eorts to avoid deforestation a F B (θ) is really applied by the Agent once she has signed the contract. Starting from the FB contract menu of (equivalent) contracts d F B (θ), t F B (θ) θ ∈Θ or a F B (θ), t F B (θ) θ ∈Θ if the Agent chooses to apply d F B (θ) in the contract (that is the real eort will be a(θ,θ) = θ − d F B (θ)) then
As a result, deforesting Agents are likely to overstate their baseline announcement (θ > θ). However if the Agent chooses to apply a F B (θ) (then u(d (θ) ) and U (θ) is the rent.
Second, in order to solve max C d (θ) E d (W ) s.t. U (θ) ≤ 0 and d (θ) ≥ 0, we substitute t(θ) and include the expected information rent (after by parts integration), which leads to donor's decision program:
This leads to the following rst-order condition that denes the second-best deforestation level d * (θ) as the value of d such that:
where ϕ (θ) = F (θ) f (θ) is known as the hazard rate of the prior belief F (θ), which is increasing because the latter has been considered log-concave. From its linearity in U (θ), we also derive that U * (θ) = 0. Dierentiating (4) with respect to θ, veries the second order incentive compatibility condition: d (θ) ≥ 0. Indeed as ψ ≥ 0 :
≥ 0 d * (θ) is increasing at the margin with the BAU baseline.
Third, studying d * (θ) as the implicit continuous solution in (4) shows that d * (θ) ≥ d F B (θ). Finally, The optimal transfer t * d (θ) can be stated as follows t * 
where the transfer is dened by t (θ) = V (θ) + ψ(a (θ))+u(θ)−u(θ−a (θ)) and the rent is V (θ). Again, the donor problem is to determine C a (θ)
to maximize E a (W ) taking into account the participation V (θ) ≥ 0 and incentive compatibility constraints. With a PC contract the rst order incentive compatibility constraint implies V (θ) ≥ V (θ,θ) that is Eq. (3) in the text. Spence-Mirrlees property is also veried as ∂ 2 V /∂a∂θ = −u (θ − a (θ)) < 0 has a constant sign. So the local second-order incentives imply that a (θ) ≥ 0, because it must now be veried that ∂ 2 V (θ, θ) /∂θ∂θ = −a (θ)u (·) ≥ 0. That is, the policy decision does not decrease with the BAU baseline. The donor's problem is now to solve max Ca(θ) E a (W ) s.t. V (θ) ≥ 0 and a (θ) ≥ 0, which can also be written as
By solving it, one can state the optimal avoided deforestation a * (θ) as the value of a such that: for all θ so a * (θ) ≤ a F B (θ) asω a (a, θ) is decreasing. Equality holds at θ =θ as ϕ θ = 0, i.e., there is no distortion at the top : a * (θ) = a F B (θ). Dierentiating implicitly (5) with respect to θ, shows that the second order incentive compatibility condition is veried:
a * is increasing at the margin with the BAU baseline.
Finally, the optimal transfer t * a (θ) writes t * a (θ) = V * (θ) − u(θ − a * (θ)) + ψ(a * (θ)) + u(θ) and this yields t * a (θ) = [u (θ − a * (θ)) + ψ (a * (θ))] a (θ) > 0; so it is increasing with the BAU baseline. Proof of Proposition 4: We dene a GC that is C (θ) = C d (θ) , C a (θ) , ρ (θ) for all θ, in which C d (θ) and C a (θ) are the REDD+ schemes that we studied above; C d (θ) stands for DC and C a (θ) stands for PC. ρ (θ) ∈ {0, 1} is a binary decision variable such that ρ (θ) = 0 if the contract oered is C d (θ) and ρ (θ) = 1 if the contract oered is C a (θ). It is not certain ex ante that optimal levels of transfers and actions achieved in the GC will be exactly the same as in the separate contracts studied in Sections previously. In that case the net informational rent of the As we have seen above, condition R2 holds so appying the Corollary 6 in BB yields to Y (θ * ) = 0, that is for θ * , the recipient's rent is zero. This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
Proof of Proposition 3: From
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